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The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors that contribute to the decision to initiate change in
organizational structure. The Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) research in 1997
examined, in part, the willingness of planning groups to choose to operate in an organizational structure
different from the one in which they had prior experience. The experiment involved nine six-person teams
each simulating a "Joint Task Force" conducting a complex military operation involving land, sea and air
assets. (See Benson et al. (1998) for details on the conduct of this experiment.) The data reported in this paper
are derived from planning sessions conducted by each team in which they were to analyze and choose among
three alternative organizational architectures. The focus of the analysis conducted is on the decision making
processes and the criteria the planning groups used in comparing the alternative organizational structures.
Theoretical models that define processes for diagnosing need for change as well as specific "driving" and







Two theoretical domains underlie the focus of this research. First is an interest in understanding the approach
to decision making taken by teams representing a Joint Task Force when faced with a choice among
alternative organizational designs for accomplishing a complex operational mission. Three models of
decision making are briefly described; they provide the analytic framework applied to the data presented.
 
The second theoretical domain is that of organizational change. Organizational effectiveness is recognized as
dependent on the ability of an organization to adapt to changing environmental requirements (e.g., Nadler &
Tushman, 1995). The value of adaptability is being extended to command and control structures for military
organizations (see e.g., Carley & Lee, 1997; Salomone & Crecine, 1996).
 
The decision choice facing experiment participants involved an option to change (to varying degrees) the
organizational structure in which they would perform the future operation. Thus, an important refinement of
the decision process can be derived from identifying the factors that influenced the teams’ willingness to
change. The data in this experiment are examined in terms of current change theory as it postulates factors
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Three alternative models are presented to represent a substantial domain of theory as it has been applied to
the analysis of Command and Control decision making (see, e.g., Pascual & Henderson, 1997). The Rational
Analytic perspective (Bazerman, 1990) assumes an optimization strategy while the Naturalistic Decision
Making perspective (Zsambok & Klein, 1997) assumes bounded rationality that relies on a schema-driven
satisficing strategy. Between these two extremes, Janis and Mann’s (1977) Conflict Theory model of decision
making represents an intermediate conceptualization in that it assumes when time is available, a comparative
analysis of options will be pursued; but in situations of stress and time constraint, a satisficing solution often
results.
 
The Rational Analytic decision making process is typically characterized by the following steps (Bazerman,
1990):
Define the problem
Identify the criteria for evaluating options
Weight the criteria in terms of importance
Generate alternatives
Rate each alternative on each criteria
Compute the optimal decision
This decision model is based on the assumption that the decision maker(s) can perfectly define the problem,
can know all relevant alternatives and criteria, and can accurately weight, rate, and thus rationally determine
the optimal solution.
 
The validity of the assumptions of the Rational Analytic model were questioned by Simon (1976) who
recognized the implications of both individual judgment and bounded rationality. He argued that it was
important to take a descriptive approach to the actual process evidenced in human decision making. Klein
and his colleagues have built significantly on this recommendation in their development of the Recognition-
Primed Decision model as a naturalistic decision process (see e.g., Klein, 1989, Zsambok & Klein, 1997). A
graphic presentation of this model is presented in Figure 1.
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Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) makes assumptions quite different from those noted for the Rational
Choice model described above. Specifically, NDM recognizes problems as ill-structured and difficult to
define given dynamic environments, shifting and competing goals (Drillings & Serfaty, 1997). Time stress
and high stakes make complete search for alternatives nonviable; and the differing perspectives of decision
participants along with environmental uncertainty preclude weighted valuations of criteria and calculated
determination of the "best" solution. Klein’s research has shown Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) making
to be an effective process that does not specifically follow the prescriptions of the Rational Analytic Model.
Instead, decision maker experience is applied through a process of schema matching and mental simulation
(see Figure 1) that identifies an effective solution given the constraints of the situational assumptions
described above (see e.g., Klein, 1989; Klein 1997a).
 
The Conflict Theory model of decision making (Janis & Mann, 1977) describes five alternative coping
10/22/15, 8:59 AMDeciding to Adapt Organizational Architecture:  Facilitators and Inhibitors to Change
Page 5 of 26file:///Volumes/COMB_PRO/docs/wcd00000/wcd000a6.htm
strategies in response to a consequential triggering event. Unconflicted inertia results when
decision makers see no significant risk in continuing with the status quo. If a risk in maintaining the status
quo is acknowledged, the consequent coping strategies vary primarily in terms of the degree of search and
analysis of alternatives. The model identifies Unconflicted change as the choice of the first alternative
identified that sufficiently reduces the situational risk; in this case, very limited search and analysis is applied.
Defensive avoidance characterizes a situation where decision makers acknowledge the seriousness of the
threat; but their constrained search and analysis concludes that the alternatives offer no better solution than
the status quo and they have given up hope for a better alternative. The defensive nature of this strategy is
demonstrated by selective inattention to cues or the denial of evidence of the defects in the status quo once
the pursuit of alternatives has been dismissed as hopeless. Hypervigilance describes decision makers who,
like those who choose defensive avoidance, recognize both the threat of the status quo, the inadequacy of
current alternatives, and are constrained in the time and resources available to pursue alternatives. However,
unlike the hopelessness of defensive avoidance, this strategy continues the search for alternatives; though the
time constraints typically cause decision makers to default to a suboptimal choice. Finally, vigilance
characterizes a non time-constrained situation that allows decision makers to systematically diagnose,





Organizational change can be motivated by threats or opportunities derived from either inside or outside the
organization (Tichy, 1983). Depending on both factors of timing and degree of change, the response of an
organization can be either proactive or reactive in timing and either incremental or discontinuous in degree
(Nadler & Tushman, 1995). Figure 2 illustrates the four types of organizational changes within this typology.
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Tuning represents incremental changes that are not immediately demanded by environmental or task
demands, but represent internally motivated attempts to improve performance using minor modifications to
systems, structures, processes, or personnel. The second anticipatory or proactive approach to change is
Reorientation and represents a significant shift in degree and focus as contrasted with Tuning. Reorientation,
as the label implies, requires a "fundamental redefinition of the enterprise -- its identity, vision, strategy, and
even its values." (Nadler & Tushman, 1995, p. 26). This type of change is being faced by defense
organizations in Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The scope of changes required in this mission area
includes definitions of work, formal structures and processes, capabilities and attitudes of personnel, and
organizational culture.
 
While the two previous types of change are important and relevant to DoD organizations, they were not
relevant to the experiment reported here. The simulation experiment confronted the participant teams with an
externally imposed "trigger event" to which they had to react. However, the degree of change response was a
major choice they had to make. According the typology in Figure 1, the strategy in incremental change is to
seek internal efficiencies through Adaptation; while discontinuous change requires system-wide and large
scale Re-creation of organizational strategy and related changes in organizational form, technologies and
processes. These two categories of change are within the choice domain of the experiment presented in this
paper.
 
What distinguishes adaptation from re-creation is not only degree of change, but also time frame. Adaptive
change is described as incremental; but over the life of the change effort, adaptation can accomplish
substantial and significant adjustments in organization structure, process or culture. In contrast, the time
frame for re-creation is constrained and requires fast and simultaneous change in multiple elements of the
organizational system. Nadler and Tushman (1995) also note that incremental change (tuning or adaptation)
can give an extended opportunity for pockets of resistance to strengthen; this can significantly slow or even
ultimately derail a change implementation.
 
Research on organizational change has identified several categories of resistance to change (see e.g., Carrell,
Jennings & Heavrin, 1997; Kanter, 1983; Morris & Raben, 1995). These sources of resistance can be either at
the individual, group or organizational level and can substantially influence both decision to change and
successful implementation of change strategies. Specific sources of resistance include:
insufficient perceived need for change
perception that the proposed change won’t meet the need for change
lack of understanding of the change alternatives
concern regarding personal competence under the new alternative
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uncertainty regarding roles and relationships in the changed system
inadequate resources to achieve change plan
general preference for status quo
lack of trust of change advocates
threatened self-interest
fear of the unknown
structural or bureaucratic inertia
organizational culture or norms.
In developing models for adaptive architectures for command and control, it is important to be able to
identify the factors that encourage or discourage the willingness and ability of organizational members to
consider and implement change. All of the above factors have been identified by as possible sources of
resistance. Each has specific implications for improving the adaptability of organizations. These implications
range from clarifying and communicating the evidence of need for change to developing appropriate reward
and training programs to motivate and develop needed new competencies.
 
Perhaps the most important benefit of understanding sources of resistance, is that they may represent
important perspectives that can be used to modify the change plan. Specifically, if informed and respected
personnel believe that the change plan will not achieve the objectives of change, this represents important
data that should be evaluated. By identifying the specific factors that contribute to this assessment, new
information related to the environment or the assumptions of the organizational change plan can be surfaced
and appropriately incorporated to improve the success of the planned organizational change (e.g., Beckhard
& Harris, 1987).
 
As cited above, incremental change may allow for the increased development of sources of resistance that
can discourage or impede the initiation or implementation of change. An alternative perspective of the value
of incremental change has been posed by the research of Carley (1995). Using a computational model of
organizational behavior, Carley has demonstrated that organizations that pursue incremental adjustments
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This A2C2 was designed to test a hypothesis that derived from the results of previous experiments. The
hypothesis was that teams, when faced with a significant trigger event that challenged the status quo
operation, would choose to retain the organizational structure that was closest to the form with which they
had previous experience. An extension of the hypothesis is that teams would make this choice even when the
alternative architectures were designed to allow a higher level of performance given a specific set of
optimization criteria.
 
This hypothesis suggests that the decision making approach used by teams would not follow the tenets of
rational analysis (Bazerman, 1990) due to the biasing effect of preference for status quo. It also suggests that
Unconflicted Inertia or Defensive Avoidance would be the dominant decision choices following Janis and
Mann’s (1977) Conflict Theory model.
 
The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model (Klein, 1997b) posits that decision makers will seek a
decision choice that satisfactorily matches an intuitive schema that characterizes successful action based on
past experience. This model suggests that familiarity is an important aspect in choice. And if the decision
maker’s interpretation is that a previously tried action or choice was sufficiently successful and mental
imaging suggests if will be successful in the current situation, a "satisficing" rather than optimizing decision
strategy results. Thus, the RPD model supports the research hypotheses, assuming the "familiar" option is
evaluated as offering sufficient capabilities for success in the current situation.
 
The change theories cited above were not used to predict specific types of resistance that would influence the
choice process. This aspect of the research was treated inductively. Specific attention was given the rationale
given for choice. The identification of the specific criteria used increases our understanding of the factors that








Participants in this experiment were master’s degree students at the Naval Postgraduate School. A total of 54
participants were assigned to nine six-person teams. Team assignments were balanced (to the extent possible)
in terms of service, operational vs. support experience, and gender. All but seven participants were U.S. Navy
and U.S. Marine Corps officers of rank O3 and O4. Two Navy officers were 05, one officer was in the U.S.
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Army, two were in the U.S. Air Force, one participant was from the Venezuelan Navy and one was civilian.







Each team represented a six-member Joint Task Force engaged in a mission involving air, land and sea assets.
Participants received a written scenario, op-order and organizational architecture that specified the
distribution of assets across a 6-node command and control architecture with three hierarchic levels (see




Trial 1 in which members played one of the six decision makers in the A0 architecture. This trial was to
establish a familiarity with this particular command and control hierarchy as well as to provide additional
training in the simulation software and the mission tasks. The JTF mission tasks required the application of
specific assets to eliminating enemy targets or taking strategic positions (e.g., seaport). Some of these actions
could be managed by a single decision maker; but many required the simultaneous application of assets from
two or three decision makers. For example, taking the seaport required both infantry (INF) and close air
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support (CAS). Some tasks involved sequential coordination such as the satellite identification of targets
followed by appropriate attack capability, or the use of engineers to clear mines from the roads before the
infantry could proceed.
 
Following the training session, teams were alerted to a "trigger" event that would significantly reduce their
available assets. They were then asked to conduct a planning session in which they were to select, among a
choice of three, the organizational architecture they thought would be most effective to conduct the same
mission they had practiced in training. The three organizational structures proposed to the "JTF" teams varied
on a number of structural parameters, including, differentiation (both horizontal and vertical), and asset
grouping (i.e., departmentalization).
 
Model-based researchers on the A2C2 project formulated the alternative architectures to be distinctly
differentiated on the requirements for coordination. In other words, given the specific task requirements,





"departments" would be required as compared with the two structural alternatives. The presumption related to
the research hypothesis was that by reducing the requirements for coordination, this architecture would be
able to outperform the other two alternatives in terms of speed and efficiency.
 
The six-node architecture (A0-Post-trigger) was designed to be the most similar to the architecture the
participants had experienced in the rehearsal (pre-trigger) trial (see Figure 5). The horizontal and vertical
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differentiation were identical, and, while substantially reduced, each node commander would be responsible
for assets with which he/she was familiar. However, this structure had assets distributed such that, among the




Finally, the third alternative architecture (A2) was a five-node structure designed to be intermediate between
A0 (Post) and A1 in terms of both extent to which it was "different" from A0 (Pre) and the amount of
coordination required to achieve mission tasks (see Figure 6). Thus, the research hypothesis was that decision
makers would prefer A2 over A1 because it would be perceived as more familiar and thus a more incremental
change relative to A0 (pre), even though it was not designed to perform as efficiently as A1 in terms of
coordination.
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One of the major values of the A2C2 human-in-the-loop simulation experiments is to evaluate whether
human decision makers will follow the same decision algorithms used by modelers in determining the
optimal choice for organizational structure. As noted by Kanter (1983), "Organizational change is stimulated
not by pressures from the environment, resulting in a buildup of problems triggering an automatic response,
but by the perceptions of that environment and those pressures held by key actors" (p. 281). The data
analyzed for this paper were the videotaped planning discussions of the nine six-person "JTF" teams as they
present and evaluate their perceptions of the environment, the required tasks, and the viability of each of the
alternative architectures.
 
The planning sessions allowed each team up to 90 minutes to: review the revised op-order; view a 5-minute
videotape of a "CINC" presenting the trigger event and the three alternative architectures; conduct their
planning session and select the organizational architecture they thought would perform most effectively; and
rank order the remaining alternatives. Teams were advised that the architecture they would use in the next
simulation trial would not necessarily be the one they chose. This was required in order to maintain balance
in the experimental design and to control for order effect when the post-planning experimental trials were
run. It had an added value in encouraging teams to "objectively" analyze the alternatives to determine which
one they thought would perform the mission most effectively, minimizing the influence of questions
regarding who would participate if they chose the four- or five-node structure. Teams were informed they
would have an opportunity to "play" their architecture of choice along with one other during the two
remaining simulation trials. All team members were required to attend each simulation; if using the four- or
five-node architecture, players not involved in the simulation were used to gather data.
 
Each planning session was videotaped. Sessions lasted approximately one hour. These videotapes were later
transcribed to provide qualitative data for analyzing decision process. Each planning session was observed by
a member of the research team who recorded the frequency of occurrence of twelve themes related to the
characteristics of the alternative architectures (e.g., task distribution, workload, ease of coordination).
Following each planning session, participants were asked to complete an evaluation form on which they rated
13 criteria in terms of the extent to which they influenced the team’s preferred choice of organizational
architecture. These criteria corresponded with the factors evaluated by the observers. A 6-point rating scale
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The theoretical models described above were used to analyze and summarize the decision making strategies
used by the planning groups and the factors that influenced their choices regarding change of organizational
structure. The transcriptions of the video-taped planning sessions for each of the nine teams were reviewed
several times to assess the teams’ decision processes and to identify the factors promoting or discouraging
change (including organizational design characteristics). The participant ratings of the thirteen criteria as they
influence the choice of organizational architecture were also analyzed. These results were prepared primarily
to validate the interpretation of the qualitative analysis. Means and standard deviations were calculated and a
rank ordering of the criteria, by importance was prepared.
 
 
4. Results and Discussion
 
The preferred architecture chosen by all nine teams was A0-post. Eight of the nine teams selected A2 as their
second choice. These findings confirm the stated hypotheses. Other papers appearing in this Proceedings
detail the performance of these alternative structures in the two simulations each team conducted subsequent
to the planning session. The focus of the analysis presented here is on the richness of detail and elaboration
that can be determined from the qualitative data of the planning sessions. The results of the analysis of
decision process are presented first. This is followed by the analysis of factors that contributed to the choice
of architecture. The two sources of data — participant ratings and qualitative analysis of the planning and






4.1.1 Rational/Analytic Decision Model. Five characteristic steps used in the Rational/Analytic approach to
decision making were evaluated for each of the nine teams:
1. Itemize alternatives
2. Identify decision criteria
3. Assign weightings to criteria
4. Rate alternatives based on criteria
5. Determine choice based on above
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The first was eliminated as a decision choice process because all teams were presented with a specific set of
alternatives as part of the experimental design. For the remaining characteristics, only one of the nine teams
followed steps 2-4 in conducting their planning and choice deliberations. The decision criteria used were
derived from military principles of organization (e.g., unity of command, economy of force, maneuver,
simplicity). The team agreed as to weightings for these criteria and then rank ordered each of the three post-
trigger structural alternatives in terms of the criteria. There was substantial discussion through this process in
which the criteria were clarified and the features of each alternative structure examined. An arithmetic
determination of preference resulted with A2 as preferred, followed by A0 and A1 (in decreasing order).
However, this calculation did not determine the final decision of the group.
 
The team followed the rational/analytic process with a more intuitively based evaluation of the results: "Let’s
see if this choice makes sense." The discussions here focused on mentally enacting the mission using the
architecture of choice and considering ways in which alternative structures might perform more effectively.
The process reflects the mental simulation described by the Recognition-Primed Decision Model illustrated in
Figure 1. As a result of this mental simulation, the team modified their choice such that A0 was preferred
with A2 and A1 as second and third ranked alternatives. Details regarding the features of the architectures
that swayed this decision will be discussed in the section below on the Recognition-Primed Decision Model.
However, the overall result shows extremely limited or no use of the Rational/Analytic approach to decision
choice for these nine teams.
 
4.1.2 Conflict Theory Model of Decision Making. Janis and Mann (1979) use a series of questions to determine a
team’s coping strategy when faced with a decision in response to a consequential triggering event. Four
questions were derived from this model and used to evaluate the qualitative data of the nine teams’ decision
meetings. While the teams did not explicitly answer these questions, the transcripts of the planning meetings
were analyzed to determine each team’s implicit response to each of the questions below.
 
1. Are there risks if we don’t change [from A0]?
None of the nine teams were willing to assume the status quo (A0-post) was the best strategy for performing
the mission without examining the alternatives. In fact, A0-post was recognized as requiring evaluation due
to the effect of the trigger on both the quantity and grouping of assets. The degree of perceived risk in
retaining the A0 structure varied from two teams who expressed strong initial concern with the pre-trigger
performance of A0 to two teams who saw the risk as limited, but nevertheless pursued serious consideration
of the proposed alternatives. Four teams’ discussions reflected a moderate degree of perceived risk with the
status-quo choice of A0-post. Only one team demonstrated only mild concern with the limitations of A0-post
and this did not inhibit their consideration of the merits of the other alternatives. Thus, overall there is no
evidence of unconflicted inertia as a decision strategy.
 
2. Are there risks if we do change [to A2 or A1]?
10/22/15, 8:59 AMDeciding to Adapt Organizational Architecture:  Facilitators and Inhibitors to Change
Page 15 of 26file:///Volumes/COMB_PRO/docs/wcd00000/wcd000a6.htm
All nine teams took a critical stance to evaluating the change alternatives. Three teams were more
conservative in their willingness to choose an alternative that represented a more significant change (i.e., A1
or A2). The other six teams pursued a balanced exploration of the risks of both the more familiar A0-post and
the more substantially changed alternative architectures. Thus, no teams were determined to have used the
unconflicted change decision strategy.
 
3. Is there hope for a better solution? and
4. Is there time for further search and deliberation?
These two aspects of the analysis are considered together because of experimental constraints placed on the
team decision process. Specifically, teams were limited to choosing among three defined structures that could
not be amended; and team planning and the choice determination had to be completed within 90 minutes.
Given these constraints, it would be reasonable to predict that defensive avoidance would result. This
outcome is described by Janis and Mann when teams determine, based on a limited analysis, that the
alternatives offer no better solution than the status quo and they resign or "satisfice" to that choice.
 
However, to conclude that the teams’ choice represented defensive avoidance, is not supported by the
evidence from the teams’ planning sessions. Specifically, the Conflict Theory model predicts that the
"defensive" nature of this decision strategy leads teams to become inattentive to important performance cues
or to deny the evidence of defects in the status quo choice once the alternatives have been dismissed. In
contrast to this prediction, six of the nine teams discussed specific ways in which they could minimize the
impact of the limitations of their choice architecture — A0-post. In particular, recognizing that A0-post
required more coordination than the other options, these teams planned strategies for improving their
coordination as they discussed implementation of specific mission tasks. Following the Janis and Mann
model, these six teams would be characterized as hypervigilant. The remaining three teams demonstrated
more of the sense of "hopelessness" predicted by the authors and could be characterized as defensive
avoidant. It is noteworthy that one of these three teams is the one that invested significant time in the pursuit
of the rational analysis described in part 4.1.1 above.
 
4.1.3 Recognition-Primed Decision Model. Several features of the RPD model were used to evaluate each team’s
use of this decision strategy in their planning sessions (Serfaty & Klein, 1997):
situation assessment
determining implications of situation to alternatives through nonsystematic matching and serial
evaluation through mental simulation
acceptance of "workability" of first option
satisficing not optimizing
focus on elaborating or improving options rather than focus on choice between options.
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In all nine planning sessions, individual team members assessed the post-trigger simulation situation through
review of documents and presentation of the video outlining the alternatives being proposed by the CINC. In
all but one case, teams also discussed this situation assessment as a group -- reviewing post-trigger mission
requirements and assets and relating them to their previous simulation experience. Following the RPD model
illustrated in Figure 1, these eight teams’ assessed, as a group, their familiarity with the post-trigger situation
in terms of the ways in which it matched or differed from their pre-trigger experience. Representative quotes
illustrate:
 
"There are no salient changes in the new mission op-order...The mission is still the same. Major
tasks are sending a unit to take the hill, to simultaneously attack with AAV both north and south
beach and then do a coordinated attack on the port and the airfield."
"We lose one CAS so we need to bring in the DDG to fill in for the loss of both AH1 and CAS."
"We have a problem with engineers because now we only have one unit and we need them for
more than one task."
As described in the discussion of the Conflict Theory model, all teams considered the A0-post structure
(representing the one with which they were most familiar) as a workable choice. However, the "Recognition"
and "Evaluation Action" components of the RPD model were used to evaluate all three alternatives. The
teams did not focus solely on the option that the experimental design defined as low change and high
familiarity (A0-post). Illustrative comments presented below demonstrate teams’ examination of varying
aspects of recognition: cues, expectancies, etc. The teams also evaluated the action implementation of the
three alternative structures through mental simulation. This was done serially with no systematic comparison
of the architectures (with the exception of the one team that pursued the rational/analytic assessment).
 
"In A0 Snake has the same mission with less assets...He’ll have to tag into AW for additional
CAS...Gator will have to split his time to control two attacks."
"With A1 each person has the assets they need...The only question is the engineering
battalion...But while giving each all the assets necessary, you’re putting more on each of these
individuals."
"A good thing about A2 is AW’s sea and air assets can provide support to CLF...Snake and Gator
can work pretty autonomously on land minus the SOF and engineers. That will be tough on CLF
because they can only do one road at a time."
Almost all of the teams demonstrated a clear "satisficing" attitude toward their choice. This may have, in part
been an artifact of the design that did not allow teams to modify the structural alternatives or propose one that
they might have defined as more "optimal." A significant factor in the teams’ unanimous choice of A0-post
was familiarity and consequent rehearsal value. They were confident that this structure could work, even if it
had some weaknesses. Teams frequently expressed a preference for structural alternatives not available to
them; but without this option, opted to make a satisficing choice and then examine ways in which they could
improve their performance using this structure.
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The following quotes taken from multiple teams illustrate both the satisficing choice and the preference for
using planning time to elaborate on ways to more effectively use the A0-post structure rather than continuing
to try to determine optimality among the choices given. Three teams gave significant emphasis in planning to
identifying ways to elaborate and improve their performance in A0; five teams discussed some improvement
strategies and one team did not elaborate on ways to enhance performance in their chosen structure.
 
"It sounds like the least contentious choice is to stay with A0."
"Let’s just choose A0 and go on and do some planning."
"That leaves us with A0. CLF will use DDG for shore battery...I think we can do with SAT what
we did with Tarps in Trial 1...We need to use SAT to ID where the counter attack force is coming
from so we can get the right bridge. Then you can use SAT for tactical reconnaissance."
"We need to avoid breaking up into two groups (land and sea). The sea battle is over very
quickly and I have assets that could be used to support land effort and we weren’t doing this in
Trial 1."
"We need to put one CAS in place where it can geographically be easily shared between Gator’s
requirements in taking the hill and Spectre’s requirements in taking the bridge."
 
"SOF can do ID...Spectre can be the eyes of the deep battle...to support Gator...We’ll let SOF do
recon as things pop up and relieve Flag to focus on the beaches."
"We should expect, because it came up last time, that we will get simultaneous tasking and CLF
will have to have priorities to resolve these...We should go through a priority launch for CLF."
 
4.2 Willingness to Change
 
The analysis of the team planning and decision choice from the perspective of attitudes toward change is not
totally discrete from the previous discussion of decision making processes. However, the focus of this section
will be on applying concepts from theories of planned change to understanding the choice of the A0-post
structure as preferred by all nine teams. We use Nadler & Tushman’s (1995) typology of organizational
change to interpret the choice results. As described in the literature review, because the simulation involved
an unanticipated trigger event, only the "Reactive" forms of change are applicable. Adaptation represents a
more conservative, incremental response while Re-creation reflects substantial change in organizational form,
processes, culture, or technologies.
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Clearly, the unanimous selection of A0-post as the preferred architecture can be interpreted as adaptation
rather than the more discontinuous form of re-creative change. The purpose of this section of the analysis is,
however, to inductively derive the rationale for this choice to further our understanding of both the perceived




4.2.1 Criteria Influencing Decision Choice: Observer and Self-Report Ratings. Following each planning session, team
members were asked to rate 13 factors in terms of their importance to the choice of organizational structure.
The overall group mean ratings (and standard deviations) are presented in Table 1. These findings were
confirmed by the objective observer ratings in that the top six criteria factors listed in Table 1 were also cited
as most frequently discussed by the aggregate of the observers’ tabulations. The interpretation of these




Task distribution 4.37 (.85)
Resource distribution 4.20 (.74)
Workload distribution 4.19 (.91)
Perceived ease/difficulty of
performing tasks 4.00 (.93)
Perceived ease/ability of
coordinating on tasks 3.98 (.83)
Architecture similarity to pre-trigger
condition (A0-pre) 3.75 (1.15)
Effects of trigger event 3.60 (1.03)
Flexibility of architecture/structure 3.51 (.96)
Adaptability of architecture/structure 3.39 (1.03)
Command structure 3.37 (1.00)
Sequencing of tasks 3.37 (1.09)
Perceived performance 3.34 (1.13)
Security provided by architecture 2.76 (1.14)
* N=54. Ratings based on a 6-point scale where 1=not
important; 6=very important. A difference between means
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of approximately .3 or greater is required for a single




Table 1. Participants’ Mean Ratings of Criterion Importance in Choice of Architecture
 
4.2.2 Qualitative Results: Need for Change. Research on organizational change has shown consistently that one of
the most significant factors influencing attitude toward or willingness to change is the perception of a need
for change. Need for change is typically instigated by some event in the environment that threatens the
continued success of an organization unless some adjustments are made in structure, process, technology, etc.
In this simulation, change was imposed through a trigger event that significantly reduced the assets available
to the JTF to perform the mission in the same way they had rehearsed (using A0 pre-trigger organization
structure). Thus, "need for change" must be interpreted in this context.
 
As indicated in Table 1, the rating of the trigger event (mean=3.60) as a factor used to determine the choice of
structure is significantly below the top rated factors. All three of the proposed organizational structures
represented some degree of change. The question facing the teams was whether the situation and the
characteristics of the alternative structures justified the most conservative change (A0-post), a more radical
change (to A1 that was designed to reduce coordination requirements) or an intermediate change (A2).
 
As discussed previously in the application of the Conflict Theory model to the teams’ decision processes,
teams could not be defined as using either unconflicted inertia (i.e., accepting A0-post without considering
alternatives) or unconflicted change (noncritical acceptance of change away from A0-post). Rejection of
unconflicted intertia is supported by the fact that all but one team showed at least moderate concern with pre-
trigger performance of A0. Rejection of unconflicted change is evident by several factors. Specifically, six of
the teams noted that they had had underutilized (slack) resources when implementing A0 in the pre-trigger
simulation. Thus, the loss of resources resulting from the trigger was not seen as a significant threat to their
performance using A0-post. In fact, these teams stated that the reduction in resources could make their
performance more effective due to decreased role complexity that would be required with A0-post.
 
Another factor that reduced the perceived need to pursue more radical adaptation (i.e., to A1 or A2) was the
conviction expressed by seven teams that they had developed important coordination capabilities using A0-
pre. These capabilities would not generalize to A1 or A2, and teams felt their coordination competencies in
A0 could compensate for the design value of A1 (and A2 to a lesser extent). In other words, while teams
recognized that A1 and A2 would require less coordination due to the aggregation of assets within nodes,
they felt that in the A0-post structure they would be able to accomplish required coordination given the skills
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they had developed in the Trial 1 simulation. Thus, overall, teams perceived all three structural options as
representing change due to the impact of the trigger event. However, there was not significant dissatisfaction
with the perceived capabilities of A0-post to motivate a need for significant adaptation (away from A0-post).
 
4.2.3 Qualitative Results: Sources of Resistance to Change. The qualitative analysis included an assessment of
evidence of the other potential sources of resistance that were described in the theory section (see 1.2). In
addition to the limited perceived need for change described above, evidence was found for two factors that
inhibited willingness to change:
perception that the proposed change won’t meet the need for change
concern regarding personal competence under the new alternative.
It is noteworthy that these two factors represent a rational and reflective reaction to change and potentially
provide important guidance about limitations of specific features of the change alternatives. These
characteristics are elaborated in the discussion below. Of equal note is the absence of evidence that change is
being resisted because of factors that can be categorized as organizationally dysfunctional — e.g., mistrust,
concern for loss of personal power, lack of understanding of alternatives, or general preference for status quo.
 
One example of the concern of competence was the previously discussed coordination skills. Teams stated
that these skills, learned and practiced using A0-pre would not generalize to A1 or A2 as readily as they
would to A0-post. The rating of this factor as presented in Table 1 was rated fifth in order of influence
(mean=3.98). In the qualitative analysis, coordination was identified in the discussions of seven of the nine
teams as a factor that motivated their choice of A0-post. They also argued that the coordination capabilities
would provide them greater flexibility to respond to unanticipated requirements.
 
Team members’ had additional concerns with competencies that related more generally to the value of
rehearsal in all aspects of their role responsibilities. Seven teams argued that, while A1 and A2 had specific
beneficial design features that may have been more advantageous than those of A0-post, the risks to
performance of having to learn to use new assets or to coordinate with a unit they hadn’t interacted with
previously, outweighed these advantages. The importance of the rehearsal factor is reinforced by the two
ratings reported in Table 1: "Architecture similarity to pre-trigger condition (A0-pre)" (mean=3.75) and
"Perceived ease/difficulty of performing tasks" (mean=4.00).
 
A factor related to competence was the teams’ discussion of the full utilization of available personnel. The
importance of workload in determining choice of architecture is supported by the mean rating of 4.19 in
Table 1. Even though all nine teams noted that architecture A1 would require less coordination than the other
two alternatives, all nine teams also argued that structure A1, in particular, would place a workload demand
on the four unit commanders that could impede effective performance. Thus, the teams’ unanimous
determination was that the workload of the six-node architecture, even given the increased coordination
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requirements, would allow better performance than the workload of the four or five-node architectures with
reduced coordination requirements.
 
The second major category of resistance to change was identified above as "perception that the proposed
change won’t meet the need for change." Teams identified a number of factors they felt would inhibit the
capability of alternative structures to achieve the mission requirements after the trigger event. These factors
provide explanation for the top two criteria from the self-report ratings in Table 1 -- distribution of tasks
(mean=4.37) and the distribution of resources (mean=4.20).
 
The distribution of tasks and resources is clearly related to the issue of workload already discussed. But
another aspect of task and resource distribution is that of complexity. When the modelers designed A1 to
reduce required coordination, the effect was to increase the diversity of tasks and resources assigned to each
organizational unit. From the perspective of the participant decision makers, their roles would be significantly
more complex in A1 than in A0; with A2 having moderate role complexity. Eight teams expressed concern
that having simultaneous responsibility for both the ground battle and the air defense or protection of the
carrier battle group would exceed the capabilities a single decision maker at a given organizational node.
They preferred a structure where each unit was more homogeneous in terms of functional specialization.
 
One final observation of the factors influencing architectural choice is worthy of note. As discussed in the
review of change theory, threatened self-interest or power is a significant source of resistance to change. With
shifts in organization power to decentralized, distributed, and empowered decision making, those who
represent the operating level of the organization and the beneficiaries of these changes are often an important
motivating source for change.
 
Extending this concept to these data, it would be reasonable to expect that the reduction in hierarchy, and a
resulting increase in authority, autonomy, or power that is offered by A1 as the only 2-level structure would
be motivators toward that choice. However, the planning discussions evidence a different interpretation.
While not addressed by all teams, a majority stated that their experience in A0-pre was that the senior
commanders (Flag and CLF) had operated using a very decentralized decision authority. Thus, A1's reduction
in levels of command did not offer any unique advantages over the A0 structure as it was implemented by the
individuals in command positions.
 
However, individual difference variability is demonstrated by two "Flag" officers. One commented that he
preferred A1 because it gave him more assets and more direct contact with the unit commanders conducting
the missions. In contrast, on another team the "Flag" stated that Gator and Snake didn’t need to have him
"getting in their knickers; they’re doing fine on their own." The implication of this finding is that there are
potentially important individual leadership style factors that can influence both the choice of organizational
structure and the effectiveness of those structures.
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The unanimous team choice of architecture A0 and near unanimous preference for A2 over A1 support the
hypothesis that teams would prefer the organizational structure that represented the most limited degree of
change. As described in other A2C2 reports in this Proceedings, the teams’ choice was born out in the
performance data as well. While the performance of architectures on the mission tasks is not the focus of this
paper, these results give important validity to the teams’ choice arguments that have been detailed here. These
findings support Carley’s (1995) demonstration of the improved performance of organizations that use
incremental versus substantial change strategies. The teams’ choice also reflected a prediction that is
supported by research of Hollenbeck and Ilgen (1996) who found that specialist units that must coordinate
together will outperform generalist units that have a reduced need for inter-unit coordination, but must cope





Overall, there is strong evidence for the use of Recognition-Primed Decision process as the teams examined
the situation and the structural alternatives, made their choice selections, and mentally simulated the
implementation of the architectures and ways to improve their performance in subsequent trials. This model
provides the most comprehensive representation of the decision process evidenced in the planning data.
There is little evidence of the teams’ use of the Rational/Analytic decision process. The Conflict Theory
model accurately explains the teams’ rejection of the two coping strategies of unconflicted inertia and
unconflicted change. However, it incorrectly predicted teams would evidence hopelessness and thus cope
using defensive avoidance when they realized limited alternatives. Instead, the majority of teams demonstrate
the use of the strategy of hypervigilance in continuing to seek cues and improvements in the face of an
admittedly sub-optimal satisficing choice.
 
The RPD model provides important elaboration and explanation of the inadequacies of the Conflict Theory
by predicting the matching, recognition, and elaboration on improvements that was evident in the teams’
planning processes. Data from this study did not, however, demonstrate that teams focused their decision
making only on determining the workability of the most familiar alternative, as the RPD model outlines.
These results suggest the RPD model could be elaborated to reflect the simultaneous, recognition, matching,
and mental simulation of multiple alternatives as proposed by Lipshitz and Strauss (1996).
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5.2 Willingness to Change
 
The obvious finding of the 1997 A2C2 experiment was the teams’ preference for the organizational structure
that was most familiar to the one they had previously experienced in the simulated joint mission. However, to
interpret this result as representing an unwillingness to change would not be an accurate reflection of the data
presented in this paper. As noted above, the choice was not based on inertia or an undiagnosed preference to
retain the status quo. Instead, there was a consistency in the teams’ identification of organizational
characteristics in A0 that they predicted would more effectively serve mission performance.
 
Familiarity was one persuasive aspect of A0. Teams noted that rehearsal is an important aspect of the
preparation of defense operations; and this value would be diminished with either of the less familiar
architectural options. The question this raises relates to the trade-off between the value of rehearsal as
contrasted with the optimal design features of less familiar alternatives. An important area for future research
is to identify when the design features of novel structural alternatives outweigh the value of rehearsal
(familiarity) as determined by mission performance. Another implication of this finding is the need for
training (rehearsal) that focuses on the experience of using diverse organizational configurations. Making
personnel familiar with the process and value of adapting structures could address participants’ concern with
employing an architecture they had not experienced. This is also a more feasible training objective than
defining and rehearsing all the possible organizational configurations that future missions may require.
 
"Inertia," "resistance," "preference for the status quo" could all be used to describe the results of this study if
the choice of A0-post is viewed as no change. This does not, however, capture the fact that the A0-post-
trigger architecture represented a nontrivial change in both the assets available to accomplish the mission and
the degree of coordination required. The pejorative character of this language also misrepresents that
deliberative analysis used by teams in determining this choice. As researchers in planned change have argued,
there is important learning to be gained from the rationale presented by organizational members when they
have an opportunity to critique change proposals (e.g., Beckhard & Harris, 1987). The participants’ concern
regarding the degree of role complexity of architecture A1 and their expressed valuation that the coordination
requirements of A0 would provide the organization adaptive capabilities provide important guidance for the
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